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Connect tradition and progress |
„Methodenstreit“ and Political
Science
The
Methodological Science War
at the Beginning of the 21st Century between
the
scientistic Establishment and phronetic Perestroicans
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Charts:
„Methodenstreit“ and Political Science
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Other files in English:
 Chart 1: The
Ten Levels of Scientific Methodology
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|
1.1 Philosophical foundations:
Tasks and limits,
axiological, epistemic, methodological and ontological assumptions, conditions or criteria as well as ideals and proper-ties of
scientific research |
1.1.1 Philosophical level
(1) |
A. Tasks and objectives of scientific research
B. Limits of scientific research
C. Axiological, epistemic, methodological and
ontological assumptions of (political) scientific
research |
1.1.2 Knowledge level
(2):
general conditions or general (core) criteria of knowledge |
General postulates of
rationality:
A. Intersubjectivity
B. Objectivity
C. Reliability
D. Validity |
1.1.3 Level of
ideals and properties (3)
of scientific research |
Ideals
|
Properties |
A. Truth
B. Rightness (Ethics)
C. Justice (Politics)
D. Phronesis
E. Efficacy |
A. True/False
B. Right/Wrong
C. Just/Unjust
D. Wise/Unwise
E. Effective/Ineffective |
|
1.2 Scientific tools
|
1.2.1
Concept level (4) |
Scientific concepts |
| 1.2.2
Sentence level (5) |
Scientific sentence
(truth-apt propositions, not truth-apt norms, i.e. justice standards, pragmatic or technical rules) |
| 1.2.3
Theory level (6) |
Scientific theories |
| 1.2.4 Logic level (7) |
Formal inference and
inference rules related to
scientific concepts and scientific sentences |
|
1.2.5
Argumentation level (8)
|
Argumentation inside
scientific theories or logical structure of scientific arguments (logic of
research) |
| 1.2.6
Methods level (9) |
Scientific
investigation of facts and judgements,
generation and evaluation of facts |
| 1.2.7
Methodical approaches level (10) |
Scientific generation
of theories |
|
Chart 2: Three Traditions
and Ten Levels of Political Science Methodology |
|
Scientific methodologies and types of
science |
I. Descriptive tradition:
empirical-descriptive methodology (sciences) |
II. Explanatory-Prognostic Tradition:
empirical-explanative and empirical-prognostic methodology
(sciences) |
III. Practical tradition:
practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) methodology
(sciences) |
|
1. Philosophical level |
Descriptions:
description of (visible) phenomena,
interpretation of symbols (text, image, audio and
video), especially by means of language |
Explanations and predictions:
recognition and explanation of invisible
causalities using especially
logic and mathematics |
Valuations:
world change, Design of the Political Order,
practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) standards (norms) and
regulations using logic, language and mathematics
|
|
2. Knowledge level |
Empirical-descriptive
knowledge
|
Empirical-explanatory and empirical-predictive knowledge |
Practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) knowledge |
|
3. Level of ideals and
properties |
Ideal of truth
Predicates: true or false |
Ideal of rightness (ethics): right/wrong
Ideal of justice (politics): just/unjust
Ideal of phronesis (Klugheit): wise/unwise
Ideal of efficacy: effective/ineffective |
|
4. Concept level |
Qualitative, interpretative
or classificatory concepts
|
Quantitative, mathematical
or metric concepts |
Practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) concepts |
|
5. Sentence level |
Descriptive propositions
|
Explanatory and
predictive propositions |
Norms, i.e. justice standards, pragmatic and technical rules |
|
6. Theory level |
Empirical theories consist of systems of propositions,
including propositions about standards and rules. |
Practical theories consist of regulations, i.e. systems of empirical
statements and
practical standards and regulations. |
7. Logic level
Formal inference and inference rules related to
scientific concepts and scientific sentences |
Truth-apt logic:
Propositional logic: It is the case, that [...]
Predicate
logic: F "is a human".
Modal logic, e.g. alethic modal logic:
It is necessary/impossible/possible/contingent that [...]
Epistemic (doxastic) logic: It is believed/considered
impossible/conceivable that [...]
Tense logic: It was/will be/always will be/always was the
case that [...]
Deontic logic (is-ought, Sein-Sollen):
It ought to be/it is forbidden/permitted/indifferent that [...] |
Unlike classical logic, these are not truth-apt
(Jørgensen's dilemma). Logic of Norms (act-ought, Tun-Sollen, not is-ought,
Sein-Sollen), logic of imperatives, interrogative
logic, legal logic, logic of implementation
(Durchführungslogik).
Efficacy and rightness, Prima-facie property of ethical norms and
political maxims of action.
Conflicts of justice standards and mediation of justice standards.
|
|
8. Argumentation level
Argumentation inside scientific theories or logical structure of
scientific arguments, logic of scientific research
|
Analytical, dialectical, empirical, evolutionary
or hermeneutic means of argumentation |
Practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) argumentation |
Explaining-understanding-debate
thought of as complementary |
Practical, substantive argumentation:
practical syllogism and
pragmatic syllogism
|
|
Understanding |
Explaining |
Abductive, inductive,
substantial, warrant-using, tentative, formally invalid, epagogical
argumentation:
Hegelian dialectics,
hermeneutic circle
|
Deductive, analytical,
warrant-establishing,
conclusive, formally valid argumentation:
deductive-nomological
model (or HO schema),
evolutionary explanatory model |
|
Aristotelian topic (dialectics) |
|
9. Methods level
with reference to political science.
Scientific investigation of facts and judgements,
generation and evaluation of facts.
|
Empirical-descriptive methods
|
Empirical-explanatory and empirical-predictive methods |
practical (normative, pragmatic and technical) methods |
Qualitative methods:
content analysis,
document analysis,
participatory observation |
Quantitative methods:
quantitative data collection,
correlation and
regression analyses |
Arguing, discourse,
deliberation, mediation, synopsis,
categorical imperative,
evaluation, implementation planning,
technology assessment (TA) |
|
Triangulation: The application quantitative and qualitative methods on a
phenomenon. |
10. Methodical
approaches level
with reference to political science
Generation and evaluation of
theories |
Approaches with empirical and practical elements |
|
Socio-technological, synoptic, practical-normative,
critical-dialectical, empirical-normative,
argumentative and pragmatic approach, rational choice approach,
advocacy coalition approach, governance approaches, actor-centered
approaches (decision arenas, networks, exchange and negotiation
systems, regimes) |
|
Empirical approaches |
Practical approaches |
Historical, institutional
and structuralist approach,
narratives, frames, discourses |
Behavioural,
functional and
quantitative approach |
Participatory policy approach,
decisionist, synoptic,
normative, pragmatic and
technical approach
|
|
Chart 3: : The liberal-scientistic narrative:
axiological, epistemic, methodological and ontological
assumptions of the platonic-galilean tradition |
Ontological assumptions
|
1. External reality both given and constructed
2. Causal reductionism or causality as an invisible relation that which
holds the world together at its core
3. Empirical reductionism
4. Equivalence between causality and action
5. Inversion of causalities: The transformation of empirical causal
propositions produce social-technological rules or normative statements. |
| Epistemic objectives |
6. Causal regularities and generalisations at
the macro level
7. but also causal processes or causal mechanisms at the micro level
8. Postulates of rationality: intersubjectivity, objectivity, reliability,
validity
9. Ideal of truth, coherence theory or correspondence theory of truth
10. If-then depth structure and hypothetical character of knowledge.
Conjectures, therefore, neither a search for universal truths nor context
knowlege! The context is stored in the ceteris paribus
conditions
or is implicitly assumed.
11. Methodological individualism
|
| Methodological procedures |
12. Logic and mathematics as the preferred means
for world recognition and world change
13. logical-mathematical concepts, data-set observations (DSOs) and
causal-process observations (CPOs)
14. Truth-apt empirical and normative statements
15. Falsifiable causal hypotheses
16. Deductive and inductive argumentation
17. Model thinking
18. Experiments (simulations)
19. Quantitative methods (e.g. correlation and regression analyses)
20. Qualitative-mathematical methods e.g. process analysis (process
tracing),
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) |
Axiological, practical
(normative, pragmatic and technical) assumptions |
21. Liberalism
22. Utilitarianism
23. Universalism
24. Separation between Is and Ought
25. Normative rational choice theory as a practical approach |
|
Chart 4: The phronetic
Narrative of the Perestroikans:
axiological, epistemic, methodological and ontological assumptions |
| Ontological assumptions |
1. Constructed reality
2. Detecting tension points |
| Epistemic objectives |
3. Contextuality of knowledge
4. Description of phenomena
5. Use of symbols (texts, pictures, audio and video), naming
6. Local knowledge
7. Language rules, interpretation schemes, forms of life (Lebensformen)
8. Framing, structures and patterns of interpretation |
| Methodological procedures |
9. Qualitatively-interpretative tools (concepts,
methods and methodical approaches, e.g. qualitative content analysis,
discourse analysis, hermeneutics)
10. Quantitative tools; the quantitative-qualitative schism is rejected
and a
diversity of methods propagated
11. Methodological holism |
Axiological,
practical
(normative, pragmatic and
technical) assumptions
|
12. Better practical relevance, problems with
practical relevance (problem-driveness)
13. Pragmatism
14. Hermeneutics
15. Phenomenology
16. Philosophy of language
17. Critical theory
18. Structuralism
19. Applied phronesis |
| Assumptions that do not produce
fundamental contradictions to the scientistic narrativ |
20. No universal truths
21. Contextuality of knowledge
22. External reality constructed or given
23. Coherence theory of truth instead of correspondence theory of truth |
|
Chart 5: Actor-centered Explanations,
the Rational Choice Approach |
Macro or
system level
|
1. (a) Collective
characteristic
|
(b)
Collective hypothesis,
causal regularity, nomological explanations:
"nomological conception of scientific
explanation", "explanation2"
(Salmon 1989: 184).
 |
4. (c) Aggregate
characteristic |
Transition from macro to
micro level,
explanation at the micro level and transition from the micro to the macro
level |
A. Context hypothesis |
B. Individual hypothesis,
causal process, ontic explanations: "ontic
conception of scientific explanation".
"causal/mechanistic explanation"
"explanation1"
(Salmon 1989: 182 and 184).
|
C. Aggregation rules |
Micro or
individual level |
|
2. Individual characteristic (actor) |
3. Individual
characteristic (action) |
|
| |
Logic of situation
The assumptions made here model the relationship between the situation and
the actor.
Coleman describes these as rules that ensure the transition from macro to
micro level. . |
Logic of
selection
Teleological action theory of the individual level, here concerning the
rules and preferences on the basis of which the
individuals choose what action to take. |
Logic of aggregation
Transformation rules based on which
the collective explanandum is derived. Coleman designates them as
rules which ensure
the transition from the micro to the macro level. |
| Sources: My own presentation
based on the sketches of
Coleman (1990: 10 and 13), and the 1st
chapter (Coleman 1990),
von Beyme (2000 [1972]: 136-150),
Braun (1999:
17-52) and Salmon (1989). |
|
Chart 6: Methodology of empirical political science |
| Type of science
|
Human and cultural sciences
(humanities), interpretivists |
Real social/political science,
phronetic perestroikans |
Social sciences,
scientistic
scientists |
Forms of knowledge
|
Empirical (empirical-descriptive)
knowledge.
|
Empirical knowledge |
Empirical (explanatory and predictive)
knowledge |
Tasks and objectives
|
World understanding, world
interpretation, world description |
World explanation |
Interpretation and
interaction:
describe or critique
lifeworlds and text analyses. |
Describe visible
phenomena
(phainómenon: visible
appearance). |
Discover
tension points |
Recognize invisible causalities between
events,
explain causal regularities and causal processes. |
| Knowledge objectives |
Descriptive, exploratory,
critical |
Explanatory, predictive |
| Tools in a large sense(Organon) |
Language as a
preferred means of world recognition, world
interpretation and world description of (visible) phenomena,
especially interpretative and qualitative-classificatory
tools (concepts, methods and methodical approaches),
e.g. qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, hermeneutics.
|
Logic and
mathematics as preferred means of
world recognition and
world explanation of invisible causalities,
especially quantitative and qualitative mathematical tools, experiments
and simulations. |
Macro level
|
Language rules,
interpretation schemes,
forms of life,
framing,
structures and
patterns of interpretation. |
Description of phenomena at the macro level,
e.g.
demonstrations. |
Show power structures. |
Nomological explanations:
probabilistic laws
or regularities,
complex interrelationships,
causal or nomological
regularities, (explanation2,
Salmon 1989: 184). |
| Micro level |
Use of symbols
(texts, pictures, audio and
video), naming.
|
Description of phenomena at the micro level,
e.g.
demonstrator. |
Discover
tension points. |
Ontic explanations:
Explain cause and effect
mechanisms, causal
processes or potentialities
(explanation1, Salmon 1989: 184). |
|
Chart 7: Methodology of practical political science
|
| Type of science |
Social Science,
scientistic scientists.
|
Real Social Science,
phronetic perestroikans. |
Practical political science. |
| Forms of knowledge |
Applied knowledge
|
Problem-oriented knowledge
(problem-based, problem-driven). |
Practical (normative,
pragmatic and
technical) knowledge |
Tasks and objectives
|
World change,
applied science.
|
World change,
problem-oriented science
(problem-based, problem-driven). |
World change,
using genuinely practical
methodology. |
| Knowledge objectives |
Social-technological |
Participatory, critical,
deliberative |
Practical (normative,
pragmatic and technical) |
| Praxis |
Establish social technology by reversing
causalities. |
Change power relationships and tension
points. |
Legitimation of normative
standardization and regulations. |
Normative level,
value discourse |
Legitimisation of
values is not possible: utilitarianism, like ethics of responsibility, is
an ethics of the second order (Wieland 1999a).
|
No normative legitimation: „Our sociality
and history is the only foundation we have, the only solid ground under
our feet“ (Flyvbjerg/Landman/Schram 2012c: 293). |
Legitimation of maxims of action or political
standards
(Handlungsmaximen oder
politische Normen). |
Pragmatic level,
pragmatic discourse |
Selection and substantiation of objectives
using a rational choice approach is not possible: Arrowparadox.
|
No pragmatic legitimation:
„[W]here
‘better’ is defined by the values of phronetic researchers and their
reference groups“ (Flyvbjerg/Landman/Schram 2012c: 290). |
Legitimation of strategies for action,
individual-pragmatic rules and sociopragmatic regulations (Handlungsstrategien,
individualpragmatische Regeln sowie sozialpragmatische
Regulierungen). |
Technical level,
means discourse |
Substantiate social-
technological regulations with rational choice
approach. |
Applied phronesis
enables empowerment . |
Substantiate instruments for action or
practical instructions for action (Handlungsinstrumente oder
praktische Handlungsanweisungen). |
|
Chart 8: Practical methodology within political philosophy and political science |
Levels of
discourse
|
Ethics and
political philosophy |
Political Science: Policy
analysis and governance research |
Actor-centered
institutionalism and governance perspective |
Advocacy coalition
approach |
Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework |
Normative value discourses.
Normative
legitimations,
normative (ethical and moral)
evaluations, here maxims of action (Handlungsmaximen).
Why should something be done? |
Third evaluation stage:
ethical-moral
rationality,
categorical imperative.
3.1 Virtue ethic
(Tugendmoral), ethical and moral standards.
3.2 Legal morality (Rechtsmoral),
(political) justice,
legal norms
(Höffe 2009[2007]: 26). |
Design perspective
(Haus 2010: 109),
"third order governing",
"metagovernor",
"meta governing",
"who or what - ultimately - governs the governors" (Kooiman 2003: 170
ff.).
|
Highest and most comprehensive
level, the "deep core belief system" consisting of normative and
ontological axioms,
"basic ontological and normative beliefs, such as the relative valuation
of individual freedom versus social equality" (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999: 121, see 133). |
„Constitutional-choice rule affect
operational activities and their effects in determining who is eligible
and the rules to be used in crafting the set of collective-choice rules
that in turn affect the set of operational rules“ (Ostrom/Cox/Schlager
2014: 284). |
Pragmatic objective discourses.
Pragmatic legitimations, objectives and purposes,
here strategies for action (Handlungsstrategien).
What should be done?
State, market and civil society.
|
Second evaluation stage: Here
objectives and
purposes are
evaluated.
Pragmatic rationality, pragmatic imperative.
2.1 Individual pragmatic rules.
2.2 Social-pragmatic regulations
(Höffe 2009 [2007]:
24-25). |
Level of structuring the practices
of problem solving by institution building (Haus 2010: 109),
"second order governing", "institution building" (Kooiman 2003: 153 ff.).
"governance structure"
(Mayntz/Sharpf 1995: 16). |
Middle level of the "policy core
belief systems"
consisting of policy strategies with which central values are implemented,
"normative commitments and causal perceptions across an entire policy
domain or subsystem" (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith
1999: 121, 133). |
„Collective Choice Rules-in-Use“ (Ostrom/Cox/Schlager 2014: 285).
„Collective-choice-rules affect operational activities and results through
their effects in determining who is eligible and the specific rules to be
used in changing operational rules“ (Ostrom/Cox/Schlager 2014: 284). |
Technical means discourses.
Technical
legitimations,
means, here tools of action (Handlungsinstrumente).
How should something be done?
Social/Political Technology |
At the first stage, means and ways
are tested for their suitability for
optional intentions or
objectives.
Technical rationality, technical imperatives.
1.1 Technical
individual rules.
1.2 Social-technological regulations (Höffe 2009 [2007]: 23). |
Level of an operative practice of
direct problem solving (Haus 2010: 109),
"first order governing", "opportunity creation” (Kooiman 2003: 135 f.),
"Service structure
(industry structure"
(Mayntz/Sharpf 1995). |
Lowermost level with
respect to “instrumental decisions” (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999: 133),
"secondary aspects of a coalition belief system", e.g. design of specific
institutions" (Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith 1999: 122). |
„Operational Rules-in-Use“ (Ostrom/Cox/
Schlager 2014: 285). „Operational rules directly affect day-to-day
decisions made by the participants in any setting“ (Ostrom/Cox/Schlager
2014: 284). |
| Sources:
Höffe 2009[2007],
Ostrom/Cox/Schlager 2014,
Mayntz/Sharpf 1995,
Kooiman 2003,
Sabatier/Jenkins-Smith
1999,
Jenkins-Smith/Nohrstedt/Weible/Sabatier
2014). Frank Fischer (2003: 193-198) identified four rather than three levels:
Technical-Analytical Discourse: Programme Verification, Contextual
Discourse: Situational Validation, Systemic Discourse: Societal
Vindication and Ideological Discourse: Social Choice. Comparison of actor-centered
institutionalism and governance perspective in
Haus (2010: 109). |
|
Chart 9: Scientific operations and scientific discourses with reference to political science
|
|
1. Analytical operations of political science
Analytical discourses
|
Analytical discourse: Analytical
discourse includes analytical operations and generates analytical
knowledge. This especially includes political concepts or
categories, but also models for analyzing political reality
and for legitimizing practic-political standardization and
regulations.
These are conceptual or logical truths in the form of non-empirical,
truth-apt statements. |
2. Empirical
operations of
political science
or operations concerning what is, or what constitutes political reality,
comprising of
sentences
(descriptions, explanations and predictions), and sentences
about valid standardization and regulation of a political system
Empirical discourses
|
2.1 Descriptive operation or
descriptions of political reality
|
Descriptive discourse: In this case, the aim is to
understand political reality. What exists becomes the
focus of attention – using descriptive-interpretative methods a
picture is created of what everyday politics is like in a political
system: Power structures, dependencies and political decision-making
processes are considered and examined in more detail. This also includes
truth-apt statements regarding maxims for action (guidelines, norms,
principles and values). These are identified and described, e.g. the
welfare state postulate, e.g. Article 20 of the German Constitution.
However, it also includes a detailed description of action strategies and
instruments such as social security systems. |
2.2 Explanatory operation or
explanations of
political reality |
Explanatory discourse: Political reality also requires causal
explanations. For example, there are explanations for demographic
developments, but also for why social policy has developed in one way and
not another.
|
2.3 Predictive operation
or predictions with respect to future political developments |
Predictive discourse: The need to predict future
developments with forecast is central: It makes sense to take a
look into the future in order to provide decision-makers in the present
with important key information. |
3. Practical operations of
political science
or operations concerning what ought to be,
containing discourses on standardizations or
regulations, e.g. maxims of action, strategies of action, instruments for
action, instructions for action and practical judgements
(Handlungsmaximen, Handlungsstrategien,
Handlungsinstrumente, Handlungsanweisungen und
praktische Urteile)
Practical discourses
|
3.1 Normative operation or normative
dimension of policy |
Normative discourse or
value discourse:
In this case, the political maxims of action (Handlungsmaximen)
which are decisive for the standardization or regulation of the political
system as a whole or of a policy area should be discussed. |
| 3.2 Pragmatic operation,
strategic level or dimension of policy |
Pragmatic discourse or objective
discourse: In this case, the political strategies of action (Handlungsstrategien)
that will be decisive for the regulation of a policy area should be
discussed. |
| 3.3 Technical operation, the
operational level or dimension of policy |
Technical discourse or
means discourse:
In this case, the political instruments for action and individual
instructions for action (Handlungsinstrumente) that are decisive
for the regulation of a policy area should be discussed. |
|
Chart 10: Knowledge (Wissen) versus capability (Können) |
|
1. Knowledge (theory)
Actors:
Scientists, such as political scientists, generate empirical and/or
practical knowledge, natural scientists empirical knowledge, technical
scientists practical knowledge.
|
Form of knowledge: Analytical knowledge in the form of
propositions. |
Conceptual and logical truths in the form of
non-empirical,
truth-apt statements.
|
|
Form of knowledge:
Empirical knowledge in the form of natural or social science
propositions and propositional systems, including statements about
standards and rules.
Type of science:
Empirical (theoretical) sciences.
Examples: Natural sciences, empirical social sciences.
Analytical and empirical knowledge is also propositional knowledge, because
both are formulated as truth-apt statement.
|
Descriptive knowledge in the form of truth-apt descriptions.
|
|
Explanatory knowledge in the form of truth-apt explanations. |
|
Predictive knowledge in the form of truth-apt predictions. |
|
Form of knowledge:
Practical knowledge in the form of practical standardizations and
regulations
Type of science:
Practical (normative, pragmatic and technical)
sciences.
Examples: medical sciences, technical sciences, practical social
(political) sciences.
Practical knowledge consists of three
different components:
- Why, or the normative component, consisting of ethical-moral evaluations, in
this case maxims of action (Handlungsmaximen),
- What for, or the pragmatic component, objectives and purposes, in this case
action strategies
(Handlungsstrategien),
- how, the technical component, means, here action instruments
(Handlungsinstrumente).
|
Normative knowledge in the form of maxims of action (Handlungsmaximen) and
normative-political judgements that are just or unjust. |
Pragmatic knowledge in the form of action strategies (Handlungsstrategien)
and
pragmatic judgments consisting of e.g. different methodical approaches
to cure a disease. Pragmatic rules are wise or unwise. |
|
Technical knowledge in the form of tools for action (Handlungsinstrumente)
and technical judgements, e.g. methods that contain practical technical
rules for curing a disease. Technical rules are effective or ineffective. |
|
2. Capability (Können) Actors:
Practitioners:
ccitizens, politicians, civil servants, administrators, entrepreneurs can
make political decisions. |
Practical competence in implementing empirical and
practical knowledge, to be able to do something, e.g. the ability of the
physician, craftsman, engineer, teacher, manager, politician, scientist
to produce outstanding achievements in his or her field. Capability
consists of dispositions, competencies, skills in doing something. This
is the area covered under the label of implicit,
non-propositional knowledge. This is only one part of expertise
(know-how), that of practical capability. Ryle´s conception of know
how include what I understand under practical capability and
practical knowledge, know that includes analytical and
empirical knowledge. |
|
Chart 11: Knowledge (theory) versus praxis (action) |
|
1. Knowledge (theory):
Sphere of cognition and knowledge
|
A scientist is always a theorist, no
matter whether he asserts empirical propositions regarding political
reality with an empirical methodology or whether he also legitimize
justice standardizations or regulations using a practical
methodology. In the first case the scientist generates empirical
knowledge, in the second practical knowledge.
There are no applied sciences, but only practical
sciences and scientifically trained practitioners who apply
knowledge, and scientists who generate knowledge.
|
2. Praxis (action):
Sphere of action
|
A practitioner (citizen, politician, official, administrator,
entrepreneur) changes (political) reality, whether he refers to
scientifically based empirical and practical knowledge and makes
rational decisions, or makes subjective gut decisions.
Theory and praxis are considered as complementary and not
hierarchical. Equivalence between the two, as is usual in the Bacon
programme, is also rejected.
|
|
Chart 12: Relationship between science and politics. Complementary model of policy advice |
1. The task of science
|
Use scientific tools in a wide sense (Organon) to conduct
discourses and substantiate hypothetical answers to practical
political questions in the form of empirical and practical knowledge.
Furthermore, one can criticize ideology within scientific discourses, i.e.
expose ideologies, subjective opinions and popular slogans. |
2. The task of politics
or political institutions |
To provide definitive answers in the
form of decisions by means of political discourses and political
decision-making procedures and also to assume liability (Haftung)
for all consequences associated with regulation. In turn,
determining how decision-making procedures and thus legitimacy can best be
substantiated is the task of a practical political science. |
|
Chart 13: Empirical and practical ways of argumentation |
1. Practical
(intentional) inference
|
"A intends to bring about p.
A considers that he cannot bring about p, unless he
(first) learns (how) to do a.
Therefore A sets himself to do a" (von Wright
1971: 101,
cf. von
Wright 1977c [1963] and
von Wright 1977d [1972]).
"From now on A intends to bring about p at time t.
From now on A considers that, unless he does a no later at time
t´, he cannot bring about p at time t.
Therefore, no later than when he thinks time t´ has arrived, A sets
himself to do a, unless he forgets about the time or is prevented"
(von Wright 1971: 107, see
Anscombe 1963). |
| 2. Pragmatic syllogism |
Equivalence between efficiency
(effectiveness) and truth (Bacon
1990 [1620]: 286, 4. Aphorism, Volume 2 and
James 1979 [1907]: 234).
Equivalence between causality and action (Bacon
1990 [1620]: 80, 3. Aphorism, Volume 1),
A causal theorem (C) is equivalent
to a technical rule (TR):
C (A => B, if A, then B) <=> tR
(B per A, if B is desired, do A).
Critique: "Pragmatic syllogism is a result of the pragmatic
interpretation of a deductive-nomological explanation and its connection
with a normative principle, e.g. that B is desired. Bunge sometimes calls
this expression a ´technological rule´" (Kornwachs 2012: 67, translation
JL).
There is only one pragmatic, but no logical relation
between lawful or regulative propositions , e.g. if A, then
B, and associated (technical) rules or instructions, e.g.
B per
A, if you want to achieve B , then try
A (Kornwachs 2008: 139 and
Kornwachs 2012: 64 ff.).
There
is a difference "between the propositions A and B
and the associated action A or a real state B,
which is put into action by action A" (Kornwachs 2012: 65,
translation JL).
Kornwachs takes this notation from Mario
Bunge (1967b: 132-139). |
3. Deductive-nomological model or HO schema
or
subsumption theory
explanation
(covering law model) |
I. Antecedens, singular conditions (conditio)
C1, C2 [...] Ck
II. Explanans (the explanatory), general laws (lex)
L1,
L2
[...] Lk
______________________________________
III. Explanandum, the event to be explained E
Sources:
Hempel 1972 [1966]: 239, see
Hempel/Oppenheim 1948 and Popper 2005
[1934]. |
4. Inversion of
causal principles to technical regulations |
I. Truth-apt causal proposition, A => B
(if A, then B)
II. Equivalence between causality A and action B,
A <=> B (A precisely if
B) or (A => B and
B => A)
III. Pragmatic syllogism,
C, causality (A => B, if A,
then B) <=> TR, technical rule (B per
A, if B is desired, do A)
______________________________________
IV. Technical rule, B per A (if B is
desired, do A).
Sources: My own
presentation, Equivalence between causality and action
(Bacon 1990 [1620]: 80, 3. Aphorism, Volume 1,
Bacon 1990 [1620]: 286, 4.
Aphorism, Volume 2 and
James 1979 [1907]: 234), Pragmatic Syllogism (Bunge 1967b: 132-139 and
Kornwachs 2008: 139 and
Kornwachs 2012: 64 ff.). |
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